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CAN LAW BE A SOURCE OF INSIGHT FOR 
OTHER ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES? 
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN

 
ABSTRACT 
Law has been a borrower but not a supplier. Law schools, in effect, 
have been located on one-way streets, with ideas flowing in but nothing 
going out. This essay is intended to begin a dialogue that could change the 
one-way streets between law schools and other university departments into 
two-way streets. I want to demonstrate that legal and jurisprudential 
studies can be a source of ideas for scholars in other fields. In particular, 
this essay argues that the legal concept of the burden of proof can 
illuminate disputes between theorists of modernism and postmodernism. 
INTRODUCTION 
Law has been a borrower but not a supplier. Law schools, in effect, are 
on one-way streets with ideas flowing in but nothing going out. As early 
as the 1920s and 1930s, American legal realists drew extensively from the 
empirical social sciences for guidance in legal scholarship. Then, in the 
1970s, law professors started to commonly cite and rely upon scholarship 
from fields as diverse as economics, continental philosophy, and literary 
criticism.
1
 But even now, when interdisciplinary work is all the rage across 
 
 
   Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of 
Political Science, University of Wyoming. I thank Jay Mootz, Dennis Patterson, and Mark Tushnet for 
their helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERNISM 108–15, 128–33 (2000) (discussing American legal realism and the interdisciplinary 
movements in legal scholarship from the 1970s). 
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the academy, non-law professors do not turn to legal scholarship as a 
source of information or inspiration. Mark Tushnet describes this as the 
“intellectual marginality of legal scholarship.”2 Law professors have 
consistently borrowed ideas from other academic disciplines, but 
professors from philosophy, history, sociology, and other fields have not 
adopted insights from legal scholars. Similarly, Jack Balkin argues, 
“Although law seems to be an especially susceptible discipline for 
invasion, it does not appear to be very good at exporting its own concerns 
into other fields.”3 
The purpose of this Article is to begin a dialogue that could change the 
one-way streets between law schools and other university departments into 
two-way streets. The Article seeks to demonstrate that legal and 
jurisprudential studies can be a potent source of ideas for scholars in other 
fields. For example, legal scholarship could provide valuable insights for 
philosophy, political theory, and literary criticism professors who are 
interested in deconstruction, a complex and often misunderstood concept. 
The many law professors who have written about or used deconstruction 
over the past few decades might have worthwhile ideas that should be 
shared with non-law professors. Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis, 
which is central to legal practice, can be understood as a form of 
institutionalized deconstruction.
4
  
Stare decisis requires a court to consider and follow previously decided 
cases (or precedents) that sufficiently resemble the instant or current case. 
As it is sometimes phrased, courts should treat like cases alike. Stare 
decisis thus institutionalizes conformity with the past, the following of 
tradition or history, because the old (the earlier cases or precedents) is to 
determine the outcome of the new (the instant case). But this practice also 
forces lawyers and judges to question whether earlier cases or precedents 
sufficiently resemble the instant case so as to be deemed controlling. For 
instance, is a case that questions the constitutionality of a publicly 
displayed crèche, standing alone, meaningfully different from an earlier 
case that also involved a publicly displayed crèche, but with other 
Christmas decorations? The answer is not self-evident. Because of this 
problematic quality of stare decisis, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars 
 
 
 2. Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1205 (1981). 
 3. J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 964 (1996). 
 4. For a description of deconstruction, in relation to philosophical hermeneutics and 
communication theory, see Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem of Critique: Triangulating Habermas, 
Derrida, and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 296 (2005). I briefly 
explain deconstruction infra, p.156. 
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often question the relevance of potential precedents. What, precisely, were 
the facts in the precedents or earlier cases? What were the underlying 
assumptions of those cases? What were the precise legal rules articulated 
in the earlier cases? What were the intended implications of those earlier 
decisions? Could not the earlier cases be understood in more than one 
fashion? In short, the doctrine of stare decisis leads lawyers, judges, and 
legal scholars to question the meaning of the earlier cases—to question, in 
effect, the claims of tradition. In this sense, the practice of stare decisis 
can be understood as an institutionalized form of deconstruction. 
Therefore, the many law professors who have studied and written about 
stare decisis might be able to provide insights to all sorts of 
deconstructionists, regardless of academic discipline.
5
 
This Article, though, focuses on a broader intellectual problem: the 
conflict between the incommensurable paradigms of modernism and 
postmodernism. Specifically, this Article elucidates the confrontation 
between modernists and postmodernists by drawing upon the legal concept 
of the burden of proof. This Article suggests, in other words, that the 
concept of the burden of proof, drawn from law and legal scholarship, can 
help scholars in other disciplines clarify the tensions between modernism 
and postmodernism. Modernism and postmodernism cannot be 
harmonized, reconciled, or reduced to one overarching paradigm.
6
 
However, modernists and postmodernists often perform similar tasks and 
use similar language. For instance, just as modernists do, some 
postmodernists talk about truth, knowledge, and reason. Ultimately, 
though, modernists and postmodernists each seem to live in “a different 
world.”7 Postmodernism, according to Nancey Murphy, represents a 
“radical break from the thought patterns of Enlightened modernity.”8 
Our current bearing along the “modern/postmodern” divide sparks 
strongly divergent reactions that depend largely on which side of the 
divide one stands.
9
 Avowed modernists such as John Searle and Jürgen 
Habermas tend to view the possible crossing into postmodern lands as a 
crisis or threat. Thomas L. Pangle’s views typify this modernist perception 
of postmodernism: “I mean to sound an alarm at what I see to be the civic 
 
 
 5. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948); RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
 6. A paradigm is a worldview, a set of presupposed beliefs that pervasively shapes one’s 
perceptions of and orientation toward the world.  
 7. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111 (2d ed. 1970). 
 8. NANCEY C. MURPHY, ANGLO-AMERICAN POSTMODERNITY 1 (1997). 
 9. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW CONSTELLATION: THE ETHICAL-POLITICAL HORIZONS OF 
MODERNITY/POSTMODERNITY 201 (1991). 
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irresponsibility, the spiritual deadliness, and the philosophic dogmatism of 
this increasingly dominant trend of thinking.”10 Meanwhile, 
postmodernists such as Richard Rorty and Jean-François Lyotard view the 
crossing as an opportunity of exhilarating potential. Steven Best and 
Douglas Kellner declare that the “postmodern turn” has produced “new 
challenges, excitement, and possibilities to develop new modes of thought 
and action.”11 
Over the last twenty years or so, many thinkers on both sides of the 
divide have devoted enormous energy to showing that one position is 
preferred and, ultimately, correct. As Best and Kellner observe, “there is 
significant cultural capital at stake in the postmodern turn and thus also 
interests, reputations, and concrete material investments.”12 Nonetheless, 
the difficulty, as this Article shall argue, is that the varied arguments for 
and against modernism and postmodernism have somewhat repetitive 
rhetorical forms. Namely, this Article shall identify three forms of 
contention that both modernists and postmodernists use in the clash 
between the two paradigms. The first two forms or types, arguments of 
repudiation and arguments of advocacy, are unsurprising, at least in their 
general form. The third type, allocating the burden of proof, is more 
obscure but most telling. 
An understanding of the legal concept of the burden of proof can 
illuminate the incommensurable paradigms of modernism and 
postmodernism. Most simply, in a judicial dispute between two parties 
that ends in equipoise, the party who bears the burden of proof loses. 
Modernists and postmodernists both attempt to use a similar mechanism in 
their disputes. Modernists claim that postmodernists bear the burden of 
proof, while postmodernists place the burden on modernists. Thus, when 
all else seems to fail, the allocation of the burden of proof can seem 
determinative—modernists and postmodernists each claim supremacy 
over the opposing paradigm, since the other side supposedly bears the 
burden. Ultimately, though, the consistent and repetitive use of the three 
forms of contention—repudiation arguments, advocacy arguments, and 
especially burden-of-proof arguments—suggests that neither modernists 
nor postmodernists can possibly win the conflict of paradigms in a 
decisive fashion, in the sense of proving that one or the other is necessarily 
right. 
 
 
 10. THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE ENNOBLING OF DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 
POSTMODERN ERA 5 (1992). 
 11. STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, THE POSTMODERN TURN 281 (1997). 
 12. Id. at 253. 
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Modernism, as used in this Article, entails a commitment to a subject-
object metaphysics that traces back to Descartes: the subject or self is 
separate from an objective world. In epistemology, then, modernists are 
foundationalists: knowledge requires the subject to somehow access a firm 
foundation or Archimedean point, typically the objective world. 
Modernists also commonly subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth 
and a referential theory of language.
13
 For instance, Searle maintains that 
“there is a reality that exists totally independently of us, an observer-
independent way that things are, and our statements about that reality are 
true or false depending on whether they accurately represent how things 
are.”14 
In contrast to modernism, postmodernism rejects subject-object 
metaphysics, epistemological foundationalism, and referential theories of 
language. Postmodernists tend to emphasize the operation and orientation 
of power, particularly in language. Hans-Georg Gadamer, for example, 
writes that “[t]he speaking of a language is a totality, a structure within 
which we have our place—a place which we have not chosen.”15 Even 
though they share some basic viewpoints, not all postmodernists are alike 
(and neither are all modernists, for that matter). To avoid the confusion 
that often swirls around discussions of postmodernism or postmodernity, 
this article distinguishes between two types of postmodern thinking: 
antimodernism and metamodernism.
16
 
Antimodernism refers to an extreme; it encompasses a belief in radical 
relativism. To the antimodernist, appeals to reason are no more than 
rhetorical moves that assert the dominance of one’s own cultural 
standpoint. There is no way to adjudicate among competing claims of truth 
and knowledge. When it comes to textual interpretation, anything goes. 
Antimodernism is encountered most often, perhaps, in the deconstructive 
writings of some literary theorists. For instance, Harold Bloom writes that 
“[e]ither one can believe in a magical theory of all language . . . or else 
one must yield to a thoroughgoing linguistic nihilism.”17 
Metamodernism refers to a more moderate type of postmodernism.
18
 
Metamodernists, such as Gadamer and Thomas Kuhn, explain how we use 
 
 
 13. MURPHY, supra note 8, at 2, 8, 18. 
 14. JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY 134 (1998). 
 15. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Beginning of Philosophy 29 (Rod Coltman trans., 1998). 
 16. I introduced these terms in Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem of Critique: Triangulating 
Habermas, Derrida, and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 296 (2005). 
 17. Harold Bloom, The Breaking of Form, in Deconstruction and Criticism 1, 4 (1979). 
 18. Best and Kellner likewise distinguish between “extreme” and “reconstructive” 
postmodernists. Best & Kellner, supra note 11, at 257–58. 
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reason, have knowledge, and discuss truth without invoking the firm 
epistemological foundations or subject-object metaphysics of modernism. 
They emphasize that our being-in-the-world is hermeneutic: we are always 
and already interpreting. As such, our participation in communal traditions 
not only limits our perception and understanding but also enables such 
perception and understanding in the first place. Gadamer, in particular, 
emphasizes how our hermeneutic being-in-the-world empowers us. 
Tradition inculcates us with prejudices that open us to the possibility of 
understanding or interpretation. Without our prejudices, we would lack 
direction: “the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the 
literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole 
ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world.”19 
Many modernist commentators decry Jacques Derrida as the archetypal 
antimodernist, but he is better categorized as a metamodernist. Like 
Gadamer, Derrida explores the conditions of understanding. Indeed, 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and Derrida’s deconstruction 
“should be understood as complementary postmodern philosophies, as 
mutually supportive descriptions of the hermeneutic situation.”20 Derrida, 
though using different terminology, agrees with Gadamer that our being-
in-the-world is hermeneutic and that both perception and understanding 
depend on our being situated in communal traditions. But whereas 
Gadamer emphasizes how the hermeneutic situation is empowering, 
Derrida instead stresses how it is disempowering. Derrida uncovers how 
textual understanding and interpretation always entail the denial of 
possible meanings and the suppression of alternative traditions. A 
dominant cultural tradition, which forcefully influences our perceptions 
and understanding, develops and maintains itself partly through duplicity 
and “irreducible violence.”21 Deconstruction aims, therefore, to reveal the 
marginalization of the downtrodden and forgotten—the Other. 
Yet it is wrong to conclude that Derrida denies that we can understand 
the meaning of a text. On the contrary, Derrida maintains that any text or 
event has many potential meanings. To be sure, he is not concerned with 
deciding among these competing textual interpretations; rather, he is 
interested “in relations of force, in differences of force, in everything that 
allows, precisely, determinations [of meaning] in given situations to be 
 
 
 19. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem, in CONTEMPORARY 
HERMENEUTICS 128, 133 (Josef Bleicher ed., 1980). 
 20. Stephen M. Feldman, Made for Each Other: The Interdependence of Deconstruction and 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, 26 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 51, 52 (2000). 
 21. JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC 137, 150 (Samuel Weber trans., 1988). 
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stabilized.”22 Regardless, Derrida explicitly repudiates relativism as well 
as “complete freeplay or undecidability.”23 He has “never accepted saying, 
or encouraging others to say, just anything at all.”24 In short, despite how 
he is so often denigrated, Derrida is a metamodernist, not an 
antimodernist. 
This Article is primarily focused on the relationship between 
modernism and metamodernism, rather than antimodernism. Nonetheless, 
since the article discusses a number of postmodern writers and modernists 
who attack postmodernism, none of whom use the term metamodernism, 
this Article will mostly use the term postmodernism to mean 
metamodernism.  
Part I of this Article explains the three forms of contention that both 
modernists and postmodernists use in the conflicts between the paradigms 
of modernism and postmodernism. Part II analyzes the relationship 
between the competing but incommensurable paradigms, focusing in 
particular on the implications that flow from recognizing the three forms 
of contention. Part III concludes the article by explaining the potential of 
law as a source of ideas for other disciplines. 
I. THE FORMS OF CONTENTION 
One form of contention that both modernists and postmodernists use is 
the argument of repudiation, where a participant in one paradigm attempts 
to repudiate or controvert the other. Such arguments tend to be analytical 
and logical. John Ellis’s book, Against Deconstruction, is an exemplar of 
such an argument. It is one long series of repudiation arguments that 
attempt to show the imprecise reasoning in deconstructive writings, 
especially those of Derrida.  
For example, Derrida argues that speech has been privileged, both 
traditionally and logically, over writing. Going back to Aristotle, Derrida 
shows that writing has been assumed to be derivative; it lives off of 
speech. Writing is the signifier that must represent a signified, which is the 
spoken word.
25
 Speech is the privileged origin. Derrida then deconstructs 
this privileging by showing that speech also depends on writing; writing 
is, in some senses, the origin.  
 
 
 22. Id. at 148. 
 23. Id. at 115. 
 24. Id. at 145. 
 25. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 11–12, 30 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 
1976). 
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Ellis, however, argues that Derrida’s position is backwards, both 
historically and logically. As a historical matter, Ellis maintains that 
Western linguists have “always paid too much attention to the texts and 
manuscripts of written language,” at the expense of the spoken word.26 
Ellis’s logical critique stems from his (perhaps mistaken) reading of 
Derrida. According to Ellis, Derrida not only intended to demonstrate and 
to deconstruct the ordinary privileging of speech over writing but also 
aimed to reverse the privileging. “More important still,” continues Ellis, 
“are the obvious logical problems involved in asserting that writing is 
prior to speech.”27 Human speech existed long before writing was 
invented, and some extant languages are spoken but not written, yet none 
are written but not spoken. 
One common type of modernist repudiation argument revolves around 
a binary opposition. First, the modernist thinker identifies one or more 
“binary” oppositions—either/or types of arguments—which flow from 
subject-object metaphysics and thus typify modernist thought.
28
 For 
instance, modernists often declare that either we have objective 
knowledge—knowledge grounded on some firm foundation—or we are 
relegated to free-floating subjectivism and relativism. Likewise, some 
modernists maintain that either we must be independent subjects with 
freedom of will or we must be no more than completely determined 
automatons. Then the modernist thinker characterizes the postmodern 
position along the binary opposition. Finally, the postmodern position is 
rejected because it falls on the wrong side of the either/or. 
Ronald Dworkin uses this type of repudiation argument in his attack on 
postmodernism. He insists that a true proposition must be objectively true, 
or it contains no truth at all. Thus, according to Dworkin, postmodernists 
must tacitly assume the objective truth of their own beliefs (particularly 
regarding the truth of the postmodern paradigm), or “they could only 
present their views as ‘subjective’ displays in which we need take nothing 
but a biographical interest.”29 From Dworkin’s modernist perspective, no 
sensible thinker would try to demonstrate the truth of her position—such 
as postmodernism—only to admit that it was merely a personal statement 
of subjective beliefs. Hence, postmodernists unwittingly manifest their 
 
 
 26. JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION 19 (1989). 
 27. Id. at 21. 
 28. CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT’S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM 74 (1990). 
 29. Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 88 
(1996). 
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own commitment to modernist objectivity, to “have discovered out there 
. . . some external, objective, timeless, mind-independent world.”30 
John Searle presents an interesting twist on this type of repudiation 
critique of postmodernism. He builds on the standard modernist binary 
opposition between metaphysical realists and antirealists. Searle maintains 
that because postmodernists deny that truth and knowledge are grounded 
on an external reality, postmodernists must be antirealists or idealists, 
perhaps akin to George Berkeley. “[I]f there were external bodies,” 
Berkeley wrote, “it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if 
there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were 
that we have now.”31 Searle then argues that postmodernists articulate such 
an antirealist position only because of “a kind of will to power.”32 That is, 
according to Searle, postmodernists reject the modernist metaphysics of an 
external realism (Searle’s preferred position) only so that they can believe 
themselves free from the constraints of reality and natural science. Of 
course, despite Searle’s argument, postmodernists never overtly claim to 
assert any kind of will to power, a distinctly modernist concept that 
emphasizes the Cartesian subject. 
Postmodernists also use analytical and logical arguments of 
repudiation. The best deconstructive works, whether of Derrida or others, 
closely analyze modernist writings in order to disclose the previously 
obscure yet problematic assumptions underlying the texts. For instance, in 
jurisprudence, Pierre Schlag demonstrates how a whole host of modernist 
scholars assume that their readers are autonomous and independent selves 
who can readily choose to effectuate any desirable change in the law. 
Schlag explains:  
Each and every social, legal, and political event is immediately 
represented as an event calling for a value-based choice. You are 
free to choose between this and that. But, of course, you are not 
free. You are not free because you are constantly required to reenact 
the motions of the prescripted, already organized configuration of 
the individual being as chooser. You have to, you already are 
constructed and channeled as a choosing being.
33
    
 
 
 30. Id. at 87. 
 31. George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in THE 
ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 509, 529 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939). 
 32. Searle, supra note 14, at 19. 
 33. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1700 (1991). 
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By problematizing such assumptions, deconstructive writers call into 
question the force or validity of the modernist texts. 
Furthermore, just as modernists often criticize postmodern positions by 
forcing them into ill-fitting modernist categories, postmodernists repudiate 
modernist arguments by understanding them in postmodern terms. 
Christopher Norris, for one, adeptly criticizes modernists for their 
consistent misinterpretations of postmodern thinkers. Norris himself 
accepts postmodernism and thus understands other postmodernists, such as 
Derrida, from a postmodern vantage. Consequently, Norris readily 
criticizes modernists for failing to do the same. For instance, Norris argues 
that Habermas mistakenly reads Derrida from a modernist perspective:  
[Habermas] has misread Derrida’s work, and done so moreover in a 
way that fits in all too readily with commonplace ideas about 
deconstruction as a species of latter-day Nietzschean irrationalism, 
one that rejects the whole legacy of post-Kantian enlightened 
thought. In short, Habermas goes along with the widely-held view 
that deconstruction is a matter of collapsing all genre-distinctions.
34
  
Likewise, through a close reading of Derrida’s texts, Norris demonstrates 
that John Ellis’s attack on deconstruction is based on a gross 
misinterpretation of Derrida. Because Ellis fails to read Derrida through 
the prism of postmodernist categories, Ellis attacks a weakened straw-man 
version of deconstruction. According to Norris, Ellis’s arguments thus 
appear bereft of analytical rigor.
35
 
The second form of contention between the paradigms of modernism 
and postmodernism is the argument of advocacy, where a thinker 
advocates for—or affirmatively encourages the acceptance of—a given 
paradigm. Such arguments tend to be of a coherence or narrative type; 
they attempt to show that a particular paradigm hangs together, coheres, or 
makes sense only as a whole. On the modernist side, Searle’s book, Mind, 
Language, and Society, consists largely of an argument of advocacy. 
Searle attempts to show that his preferred form of modernist metaphysics, 
external realism, not only eliminates traditional mind-body problems but 
also persuasively explains consciousness, intentionality, language, and 
institutional reality. For Searle, then, the virtue of the modernist paradigm 
is that it not only seems to correspond with our experiences but that it also 
fits together in a neat and understandable totality. “I want to explain,” 
 
 
 34. Norris, supra note 28, at 49. 
 35. Id. at 137–51. 
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Searle writes, “how certain essential parts of mind, language, and social 
reality work and how they form a coherent whole.”36 
On the postmodern side, thinkers from numerous disciplines articulate 
a broad advocacy argument. Best and Kellner, Lyotard, Murphy, Steven 
Connor, Zygmunt Bauman, Fredric Jameson, and many others attempt to 
show that practices from a variety of fields, ranging from art to 
philosophy, from anthropology to sociology, even from theology to 
science, all share certain commonalities that suggest a break from 
modernism. These authors try to demonstrate that these various practices 
fit together into a coherent whole, which they call postmodernism. 
“[T]here are,” according to Murphy, “new ways of understanding 
knowledge, language, and reality itself that are in various senses holistic 
and that together constitute a radical enough break with modern atomistic 
modes of thought to deserve to be called postmodern.”37 To be sure, the 
coherence of postmodernism itself is, from a postmodern perspective, 
somewhat paradoxical, as Connor emphasizes:  
What is striking is precisely the degree of consensus in 
postmodernist discourse that there is no longer any possibility of 
consensus, the authoritative announcements of the disappearance of 
final authority and the promotion and recirculation of a total and 
comprehensive narrative of a cultural condition in which totality is 
no longer thinkable.
38
 
Despite its paradoxical quality, postmodernism is, in short, a worldview 
that hangs together; it makes sense as a totality. 
Gadamer and Kuhn present a narrower type of postmodern advocacy 
argument through which they attempt to show how specific practices make 
sense in accordance with a postmodern (or interpretive) conception of the 
world. Gadamer described how his conception of philosophical 
hermeneutics illuminates our interpretation of texts. He explains how 
textual understanding is possible only because we are imbued with 
prejudices that are derived from communal traditions. In a similar vein, 
Kuhn explains how science is possible. Individuals learn to do science 
within a particular scientific community by becoming enmeshed in the 
structures or practices of that community’s defining paradigm. The 
paradigm not only shapes the questions that scientists find interesting and 
worthy of research but also molds the scientists’ perceptions of data itself. 
 
 
 36. Searle, supra note 14, at 8. 
 37. Murphy, supra note 8, at 19. 
 38. STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE 9 (2d ed. 1989). 
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The modernist depiction of scientists who access brute objective data does 
not literally make sense, according to Kuhn. An objective external world 
could not possibly ground science, because such a world would 
necessarily be meaningless. A paradigm is a prerequisite to meaning; 
learning and participating in a scientific paradigm engenders a meaningful 
world for a scientist.
39
 “‘I am not suggesting,’” Kuhn says, “‘that there is a 
reality which science fails to get at. My point is, rather, that no sense can 
be made of the notion of a reality as it has ordinarily functioned in the 
philosophy of science.’”40 From Kuhn’s standpoint, the idea of a paradigm 
makes scientific practice possible. Without paradigms, the world does not 
hold together in a meaningful fashion.
41
 
The third form of contention between the paradigms of modernism and 
postmodernism is the allocation of the burden of proof. The burden of 
proof (sometimes called the burden of persuasion or the risk of 
nonpersuasion) is a legal term of art. In civil trials, the plaintiff and 
defendant each present evidence in an effort to prove facts that show that it 
is correct or deserves to win. One side must win and one side must lose, 
which remains true even when the evidence is in equipoise—that is, in the 
case where a preponderance of evidence does not suggest that either side is 
correct. The allocation of the burden of proof decides such a case. Quite 
simply, the party, either the plaintiff or the defendant, who bears the 
burden of proof loses in cases of equipoise. To be clear, the party who 
bears the burden of proof loses, not because of some compelling reason, 
but only because she did not carry the burden by persuading the trier of 
fact (a judge or jury) that she was correct.
42
 In the book, Civil Procedure, 
Fleming James and Geoffrey C. Hazard assert that a need to allocate the 
burden of proof “seems to be inseparable from any system wherein issues 
of fact are to be decided on any rational basis by human beings.”43 The 
same is true in the confrontation between the modern and postmodern 
paradigms.  
Modernists and postmodernists alike allocate the burden of proof to 
reinforce their own contentions. Modernists, of course, allocate the burden 
to the postmodernists while postmodernists allocate it to modernists. In a 
confrontation between incompatible and incommensurable paradigms, the 
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allocation of the burden of proof is of enormous significance. Both 
modernists and postmodernists present repudiation and advocacy 
arguments, but neither side has arguments that are so philosophically 
compelling that masses of their opponents will be persuaded to switch 
sides. Indeed, the arguments on both sides are so similar in form that 
hardly anyone is likely to be convinced to change positions. In such a 
stalemate, the allocation of the burden of proof to one’s opponent can be 
an effective rhetorical move. Even if modernists do not have any 
overwhelming arguments of repudiation or advocacy, they will appear to 
win the confrontation if they place the burden of proof on the 
postmodernists—who also lack any overwhelming arguments. Likewise, 
postmodernists can appear to win if they allocate the burden of proof to 
the modernists. 
In law, a variety of factors might justify allocating the burden of proof 
to either the plaintiff or the defendant. These factors—“reasons of 
convenience, fairness, and policy”44—do not, however, transfer 
meaningfully into the philosophical battle between paradigms. In fact, 
modernists and postmodernists often allocate the burden of proof 
implicitly or tacitly. In these instances, they do not affirmatively present 
an argument for allocating the burden. Rather, they merely assume that the 
other side bears the burden, which is thoroughly predictable. If one is a 
modernist, then one sees and understands the world through the modernist 
paradigm. Postmodernism will look odd, confusing, irrational, and so 
forth. It would take a herculean argument to convince or force a modernist 
to switch sides. But no less could be said about a postmodernist. 
However, some modernists and postmodernists do explicitly argue to 
allocate the burden of proof to the other side. On behalf of the modernists, 
Searle defends certain “default positions” or “taken-for-granted 
presuppositions” about the world.45 These presuppositions form a 
“[b]ackground” for our thought and language.46 In particular, according to 
Searle, modernist metaphysics provides the default position or 
presuppositions: a real world independent of us exists and is intelligible so 
that truth is based on correspondence to that world. To say that modernist 
metaphysics is the default position, as Searle does, is equivalent to saying 
that postmodernists bear the burden of proof. Unless postmodernists can 
convince us otherwise, Searle suggests, we should remain in our default 
position and accept our taken-for-granted modernist presuppositions. But 
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why should we accept these presuppositions as the default? Searle answers 
with history: “It is unlikely that the default positions would have survived 
the rough and tumble of human history for centuries, and sometimes even 
millennia, if they were as false as [some] philosophers make them out to 
be.”47 Searle acknowledges that “not all default positions are true,” but in 
general, “the default positions are more likely to be right than their 
alternatives.”48 
The difficulty for Searle and other modernists is that postmodernists 
can just as easily construct a historical argument going in the opposite 
direction. Rorty and Richard J. Bernstein articulate this type of contention. 
Modernists have had nearly four centuries, since the time of Descartes, to 
fulfill their self-imposed goal of establishing some firm foundation for 
knowledge and truth. Unfortunately, they have failed to do so. We are still 
waiting, Rorty and Bernstein argue, for a modernist to prove convincingly 
the independent existence of an intelligible external world. This historical 
argument, of course, does not disprove modernism; it is not an argument 
of repudiation. Rather, it is an argument for allocating the burden of proof. 
That is, Rorty and Bernstein suggest that modernists have had ample 
opportunity—nearly 400 years worth—to prove their position, yet they 
have failed to do so.
49
 After such an extended period of failure, perhaps we 
should start assuming that the presuppositions of modernist metaphysics 
are wrong. We should, in other words, shift the burden of proof to the 
modernists, thus making postmodernism our default position. 
II. MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM RELATED 
The repetitive forms of contention shared by modernists and 
postmodernists suggest a basic, though important, point about the 
relationship between the two paradigms: modernists will be modernists, 
and postmodernists will be postmodernists. The discussion of repudiation 
arguments shows that each side interprets texts in accordance with its own 
presuppositions and categories. When the modernist, in effect, translates 
the postmodernist’s ideas into modernist terms, the ideas very well might 
seem weak and imprecise. They lose their bite, even their sense, in the 
translation from one paradigm to the other. Similarly, when a 
postmodernist reads modernist texts from a postmodern standpoint, the 
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modernist texts will likely appear hopelessly obtuse and simplistic. 
Therefore, one may readily criticize the other for sloppy thinking. 
When we turn to arguments of advocacy, the incommensurability of 
the two paradigms is similarly manifested. Each side advocates for its 
paradigm by attempting to show that various parts of its position make 
sense, cohere, or hang together. As Kuhn comments about scientific 
paradigms, “[e]ach group uses its own paradigm to argue in that 
paradigm’s defense.”50 Such an argument for a particular paradigm, Kuhn 
adds, “cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for 
those who refuse to step into the circle.”51 In short, modernists find 
modernist views appealing, while postmodernists find postmodernist 
arguments appealing. 
This basic point regarding the incommensurability of modernism and 
postmodernism also surfaces when we examine arguments for allocating 
the burden of proof. Because the burden of proof is always allocated to 
one side, modernists and postmodernists never will starve to death like 
Buridian’s ass, who was paralyzed into indecision and, hence starvation, 
when faced with two equally appealing stacks of hay.
52
 Thinkers on both 
sides of the divide invariably will be able to decide between modernism 
and postmodernism, although only because of the burden of proof rather 
than for some compelling philosophical reason. Modernists and 
postmodernists can always decide between the paradigms, because they 
already are modernists or postmodernists when they start the argument. In 
a different sense, though, modernists and postmodernists do not truly 
decide at all. No active decision is necessary; they already stand on one 
side of the divide or the other. They just stay put. 
Because the paradigms are incommensurable, even when modernists 
and postmodernists appear to discuss the same fundamental concepts, such 
as knowledge, truth, and reason, they give the concepts significantly 
different meanings and connotations. Thus, while participants in the 
competing but incommensurable paradigms might appear to talk to each 
other, often they just do not seem to connect. They fail to communicate 
well. Kuhn observes that scientists working in opposed paradigms “will 
inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits of 
their respective paradigms.”53 Moreover, participants in incommensurable 
paradigms frequently do not even want to talk about the same issues; they 
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“disagree about what is a problem and what a solution.”54 Modernist 
philosophers tend to dwell anxiously on the existence or non-existence of 
firm foundations. After all, from the modernist perspective, if we do not 
have firm foundations, we are doomed to relativism and nihilism. 
Postmodernists will discuss these issues, but they do not consider them to 
be particularly important. Postmodernists would generally prefer to move 
on to other issues, such as the orientation of power in society. For that 
reason, a postmodernist is more likely to write a history (or genealogy) 
that criticizes the development of certain social arrangements or 
institutions, such as the prison system, than to present an abstract, 
philosophical argument that explains how to ground a perfectly just 
society.
55
 
To be sure, then, modernists will be modernists, and postmodernists 
will be postmodernists. It is tempting to say that never the twain shall 
meet, but such a glib conclusion would be imprecise. Although the 
modernist and postmodernist paradigms are incommensurable, they do 
overlap to a degree. As already mentioned, at least at a superficial level, 
modernists and postmodernists, particularly metamodernists, often use 
similar terms, such as knowledge, truth, and reason. More importantly, the 
overlap extends beyond the mere homophonic sound of certain terms. For 
instance, repudiation arguments tend to be analytical or logical. Close 
analysis and logic are methods most often associated with modernist 
philosophy. Yet, as discussed, postmodernists also construct analytical and 
logical arguments of repudiation. Likewise, advocacy arguments tend to 
rely on coherence and narrative, methods most often associated with 
postmodernism. Yet modernists also rely on coherence and narrative 
advocacy arguments. In short, neither is above using the other’s favorite 
argumentative tools. 
Once again, Searle’s Mind, Language, and Society provides a striking 
example. Searle aims to defend external realism, a type of modernist 
metaphysics: “I think that the universe exists quite independently of our 
minds and that . . . we can come to comprehend its nature.”56 At one point, 
though, Searle acknowledges that external realism cannot “be justified on 
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its own.”57 Indeed, he does “not believe it makes any sense to ask for a 
justification” of external realism.58 Searle elaborates:  
External realism is not a claim about the existence of this or that 
object, but rather a presupposition of the way we understand such 
claims. . . . This does not mean that realism is an unprovable theory; 
rather, it means that realism is not a theory at all but the framework 
within which it is possible to have theories.
59
  
Although Searle certainly never admits as much, his characterization of 
external realism sounds remarkably like the description of a paradigm, a 
set of presupposed beliefs that pervasively shapes one’s perceptions of and 
orientation toward the world. According to Searle, but for external realism, 
discussions of the physical world would be “unintelligible.”60 External 
realism is the prerequisite or “framework that is necessary for it to be even 
possible to hold opinions or theories about such things as planetary 
movements.”61 The problem for Searle is that, even though he is 
advocating for a modernist metaphysics, the paradigm is a prototypical 
postmodern concept that Searle himself criticizes.
62
 In other words, Searle 
presents an implicitly postmodern description of and argument for external 
realism as a paradigm. 
Hence, even though modernism and postmodernism are 
incommensurable paradigms, they share the use of certain tools and 
perspectives. In fact, while modernists and postmodernists typically talk 
past each other, they still can carry on a conversation. Modernists and 
postmodernists share enough across the border of the modern/postmodern 
divide that they can and do communicate, albeit often poorly. Moreover, 
the modern/postmodern border is not completely closed. The border is 
permeable. For example, it is likely that many postmodernists began their 
careers on the modernist side and then switched, though probably at a 
relatively early age such as during their undergraduate years. Although 
movement between sides is possible, it is more likely that modernists will 
remain modernists, and postmodernists will remain postmodernists. 
Individuals on each side of the divide do try to convince the other to 
switch sides though. Most often, of course, they do so in a futile manner, 
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because modernists tend to use modernist arguments and postmodernists 
tend to use postmodern arguments. Thus, arguments to switch will seem 
most persuasive to those already on the same side as the proponent. 
Movement between sides may be possible, but, ultimately, it is unlikely 
and rare. 
CONCLUSION 
The discipline of law has long been a borrower but not a supplier of 
ideas. Law professors frequently adopt insights from their university 
colleagues in other departments, but those non-law school colleagues 
rarely borrow from legal scholarship. This article suggested how this 
process might become more reciprocal. Its primary purpose, in other 
words, has been to demonstrate the potential of law as a source of ideas for 
other disciplines.  
Specifically, the article has argued that the burden of proof illuminates 
the confrontation between modernists and postmodernists. For both 
modernists and postmodernists alike, when their arguments of repudiation 
and advocacy fail to prove conclusively the superiority of their respective 
positions, they rely on the burden of proof to win the day. Because 
modernism and postmodernism are incommensurable paradigms, the 
confrontation between them is likely to end in a stalemate with the 
allocation of the burden of proof then appearing to be determinative. Since 
each side place the burden of proof on the other, the allocation of the 
burden of proof tends to do no more than reconfirm the correctness of 
one’s own already-established position. 
The burden of proof is just one among many legal concepts that can 
help elucidate solutions to problems within other disciplines. Especially in 
this time of avid cross-disciplinary pollination, law no longer should be 
ignored or marginalized on university campuses. There is more reason 
now, than ever before, for non-law professors to look to legal scholarship 
for potential ideas. As J.M. Balkin observes: “Law has become a sort of 
meeting ground for academic ideas and trends. And because it has become 
an interdisciplinary crossroads—affected and infected by so many 
different influences—law has become, as perhaps never before in 
American history, one of the most absorbing intellectual subjects.”63 For 
this reason, legal scholarship can become a centralized source of 
inspiration and insight for interdisciplinary scholars of any stripe. Non-law 
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professors should recognize legal scholars, or at least some of them, as 
interdisciplinary experts, well-versed in the problems that arise and the 
strategies that work when integrating a variety of disciplinary views. 
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